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ABstrACt
In this article, I argue that education should neither function 
simply as a social apparatus that “grooms” individuals for 
their future societal roles nor merely supply the need of 
the global labor market. Rather, borrowing from Levinàs’ 
ethics, education must ultimately respond to the call of 
justice that springs from the proper recognition of the 
alterity of the other, and the responsibility that goes along 
with it. I further argue that a totalizing tendency of Formal 
Education occurs on two-level interactions: a.) the basic 
interaction between all the participants in the education 
system, and b.) the interaction of the students with the 
school curricula. It is in this context that I introduce 
Matthew Lipman’s version of the Community of Inquiry, 
which, I propose, is one of the many effective pedagogical 
practices that respond to the call for an ethically driven 
Formal Education.
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introduction
In Democracy and Education, Dewey outlines the inevitability 
of education in the preservation of the biological and social life of any 
group of people. He argues “the primary ineluctable facts of the birth 
and death of each one of the constituent members in a social group 
determine the necessity of education”.1 The transmission of a particular 
social group’s beliefs, ideals, symbols, tradition and even language from 
one generation to the next is by all means necessary in preserving and 
securing the continuity of life, culture and identity. Even the skills and 
methods in physical sustenance have to be acquired under the guidance 
and supervision of an elder, which in most cases, a role assumed by the 
parents. What this means is that even prior to the emergence of modern 
social institutions, relationships that are essentially pedagogical are 
primordial among members of social groups as they manifest in the most 
basic human encounters such as between parents and children, siblings and 
family relatives. In other words, pre-institutionalized human encounters 
carry with it an inevitable trait of education. However, it may be well to 
note that the educational merit of these encounters is incidental, that is, 
subsidiary to the primary aims of a social group which center on survival, 
adaptation and propagation. This means to say that insofar as human 
beings are inherently rational and social, the propensity to observe, adapt, 
generalize, apply and analyze using the usual modes of induction, deduction 
and trial-and-error are natural and expectable for the greater purpose of 
the social group. These and the many other forms of learning with and 
among the other members of a social group are basically referred to as 
modes of informal education. 
Formal Education, on the other hand, is the “deliberate educating 
of the young” which is analogous to the natural occurrence of learning by 
interacting and living with the other members of a society.2 As societies 
advance, it becomes increasingly difficult to teach the young simply 
through the direct transmission of knowledge and skills as would have 
sufficed in the pre-modern social group interactions. The necessity to 
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train individuals to specifically teach the young, the agencies devised 
to specifically organize the pedagogical process, and the materials that 
are indispensable in the modes of instruction become more systematized 
and organized. 
Formal Education, hence, is the institutionalized mode of a 
basic pedagogic encounter that initially stems from the inherent human 
propensity to learn and impart learning. The very structure of academic 
institutions is predicted on such propensity, which essentially involves 
“bringing up, training and rearing”. Following this premise, learning for 
the purpose of both developing the self and the society is constitutive of 
Formal Education. This then would be the hallmark of all formal educative 
models so that anything that falls short of it renders the entire educational 
system futile and cut-off from the ideals of a society. In concrete terms, 
when students begin to undergo the process of Formal Education, it is 
implied that they seek to be “brought up” by qualified educators that 
follow a judiciously conceived curricula that do not only address certain 
societal economic needs, but ultimately, teach and preserve universal 
human values. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that the relationship between 
these two goals is decisive because their intersections are possible areas 
where a potential problem may ensue. The need to balance the economic 
necessities to address the current demands of a society (e.g. labor force) 
on one hand; and the preservation of universal human values (e.g. justice, 
freedom and truth) on the other, is a crucial tension which any academic 
institution is constantly challenged to be sensitive about.  
My position in this article is that education should neither function 
simply as a social apparatus that “grooms” individuals for their future societal 
roles nor to merely supply the need of the global labor market. Rather, 
education must ultimately respond to the call of justice that springs from 
the proper recognition of the alterity of the other, and the responsibility 
that goes along with it. It does not always follow, therefore, that 
“education is present by default wherever modern institutionalization and 
organization of formal schooling occur, especially in today’s neoliberal 
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climate where schooling’s aim seems to be producing disciplined and 
docile economic bodies ready to be cogs in the world economy”.3 While 
it is true that in the usual state of modern societies, those who are formally 
“schooled” have the higher probability of getting secure jobs and 
promising compensation, being “schooled”, in this sense, however, 
does not necessarily mean being “educated”. This is to say that Formal 
Education does not necessarily lead to learning, while learning does not 
necessarily require Formal Education.
It is in this context that I introduce Matthew Lipman’s version of 
the concept of Community of Inquiry, a term coined by Charles Sanders 
Pierce. Drawing from the ethics of Levinas, I propose that one of the 
many ways by which the call to recognize alterity and the infinite 
responsibility to the other is best concretized and exercised within the 
context of a community that espouses collaborative inquiry and fosters 
critical, caring and creative thinking.   
This article is divided into three parts. The first part is a brief 
account of Emmanuel Levinas’ salient ethical points. The second part 
consists of an attempt to describe the totalizing tendency of Formal 
Education, which I argue, happens on two-level interactions: a.) the basic 
interaction between all the participants in the education system, and b.) 
the interaction of the students with the school curricula. The third part 
consists of a discussion on Lipman’s Community of Inquiry which is a 
model to concretize the response to the call for an ethically driven Formal 
Education. This will be followed by a conclusion.
the face of the Other
Emmanuel Levinàs’ (1906-1995) whole reflection begins in a 
concrete situation where “violence is the order of the day”.4 All forms and 
levels of violence, social, interpersonal and individual, have something to 
do with the encounter of the other. This other may be a group of people, 
a society, a neighbor, or even one’s own self. The other is seen as such 
due to its inherent nature as an entity separate from that of the subject. 
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In other words, it is naturally perceived as the other precisely because it 
is not the I, that is, it does not form part of what one considers the self. 
Sean Hand comments that Levinàs rejects the Husserlian conception 
of intentionality which “reduces wisdom to a notion of increasing self- 
consciousness, in which anything that is non-identical is absorbed by 
the identical”.5 In a Husserlian encounter, the structural form of inter- 
subjectivity is symmetrical, which allows for the reduction of the other to 
the subjective understanding of the I. It could not be emphasized enough 
that the experience of the radical alterity or the otherness of the other takes 
place when “the other is not reduced to, not transformed to an object”.6 
On the other hand, there is violence when alterity is disregarded, 
if not deliberately denied. Violence takes place when what is not the I is 
subsumed to be part of the I, that is, when the non-self is reduced to the 
self. Likewise, violence occurs when the other is subjectively interpreted 
on the basis of the self, and not on the basis of the radical otherness of 
the other. It may be well to note that violence, in this context, does not 
refer only to the cruel physical encounters with certain individuals or 
groups of people but also to the implicit refusal to recognize basic human 
differences. This is why the seemingly harmless attitude of indifference, 
for instance, is actually as violent as any act of terrorism. Levinàs explains 
that “violence is to be found in any action in which one acts as if one 
were alone to act: as if the rest of the universe were there only to receive 
the action”.7 In such case, the one which the violent action is intended to 
is perceived simply as a receiver of such act – almost like a numerical 
datum. It does not take into account the “person” who receives, because 
what only matters is its human capacity that is reduced to a mere target 
of violence. In other words, the other is reduced to an object, a faceless 
other stripped off of human autonomy and identity. It is in this context 
that the face finds its significance.   
The face arrests the attention of the subject and conveys a tacit 
message of its refusal to be enclosed. The face protests, so to speak, to 
the possibility of its containment in the perceiver’s subjective catego-
ries. Accordingly, “it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed”.8 
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Objects, on the other hand, does not present any face. It is for this reason 
that violence is easily inflicted upon objects, or better still, upon others 
whose faces are left unnoticed, if not totally denied. The occurrence of this 
objectification simultaneously intersects with the occasion of totalizing 
the other. The individuality of the other is lost. It is all summed up into 
an object of thought, and as a consequence, an object of violence. 
On the contrary, the presence of the face is precisely “the very 
possibility of understanding one another”.9 By understanding, it means 
taking the other as completely other which involves looking to and through 
the other without using any reductive subjective lens. It is through its face, 
that the other invokes an irreducible relation of responsibility. According 
to Deroo, the “pure constituting subject is essentially opened to something 
outside itself: The subject is not only self-constituted but is also other- 
constituted”.10 This movement of the I exiting itself (which is concretized in 
the act of responsibility) is naturally evoked in the epiphany of the face 
of the other. It entails a transcendental experience with the other which 
requires the self to remain external while being concerned with the other. 
This could not be emphasized more fully than Levinàs’ exhortation that 
“the other becomes my neighbor precisely through the way the face 
summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my 
responsibility, and calls me into question”.11
When beholding the face of the other, it is necessary to recognize 
the asymmetrical relationship that disrupts any attempt of the I to 
subsume. Levinàs’ insists that one should always identify the unevenness 
of the plain between the self and the other. It is only through the recognition 
of such asymmetry that the alterity of the other is preserved. And 
interestingly, it is because of the alterity of the other that the I is moved 
to leave itself, so to reach out for the other as a wholly other. This goes 
to say that, the asymmetrical relation with the other is constitutive of the 
experience of inter-subjectivity. One would always fail to enter into an 
inter-subjective realm with another human being until both recognize the 
inherent differences that make them subjects in the first place. The very 
condition of the possibility of an authentic human encounter is precisely 
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the asymmetrical relation of the I and the other. And where does this 
transcendental relation naturally begin than through the utilization of 
language, that is, by means of communication and conversation? “The 
banal fact of conversation, in one sense, quits the order of violence”.12 
This implies that to listen to another person is to allow them to be who 
they are, which necessarily includes recognizing their uniqueness and 
exteriority, and not to fall prey into subsuming the other under one’s 
subjective paradigm. 
In the next section, I will discuss the two levels of interactions in 
Formal Education where totalizing tendencies may occur. These levels 
of encounters are potential areas where there is a refusal to recognize the 
alterity of the other and the denial of the face.     
the totalizing tendency of formal education
Whether informal or formal, education is essentially a form of 
encounter. Insofar as it constitutes human individuals as participants or 
“stakeholders” in the whole process, education essentially involves various 
human encounters. These encounters are non-homologous. They are 
multi-layered human concurrences that are oftentimes conditioned by the 
individuals’ roles emanating from aggregate societal arrangements. One 
may be quick to imagine a classroom setup when thinking of education, 
but such scenario is but a fraction of the entire educational enterprise. 
This is because education, formal education at that, is an institution. As 
such, it involves a huge network of human collective that functions to 
orchestrate a self-sustaining system that aims at certain immediate and 
long-term goals. The immediate goals may vary from one academic 
institution to another, but ultimately they share a common formative 
agenda which is operative throughout the entire process. These agenda are 
normally carried out through classroom instruction, research, evaluations, 
immersion/exposure, trainings and the like. These processes follow 
certain curricula that aid learners to gradually develop their potentials to 
concrete actualities.  
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Insofar as there are no perfect human pedagogical encounters, it is 
also impossible to think of a perfect educational institution. The possibility 
of totalizing, that is, reducing the other as an object, always lurks within 
the walls of any academic setting. There are two levels of interaction in 
which a totalizing tendency in a formal education normally takes place. 
One is on the basic social interaction between all the participants in the 
education system, while the second level takes place in the interaction 
of the students with the school curricula. 
The first totalizing tendency of formal education, which is rather 
obvious, is located within the intersections of the roles and functions of 
every individual in the system – the stakeholders. It goes without saying 
that each participant in the entire educational process plays a vital role 
that is essential, in varying degrees, to the proper functioning of the 
whole system. Just as a pair of nut and bolt has the capacity to spell the 
overall performance of a machine, so as the individual whose role is 
deemed the least important in school can actually affect the entire process 
of the educational structure. These roles carry with them certain social 
functions that are aligned with the vision and mission of the institution. 
As an institutional body, a school seeks to respond to a certain societal 
need. Hence, the said functions are justified – and compensated – on such 
bases. Human encounters necessarily pass through these social functions. 
These encounters, therefore, are mediated by socially determined roles.
The problem, however, arises when individuals get “trapped”, 
so to speak, within their social function, conditioned by the social 
arrangements implicit in the school system. The logical result of these 
mediated encounters is the reduction of individuals to mere social 
actors; one among the many cogs that serve to contribute to the overall 
performance of the entire educational machine. Consequently, students 
are reduced to mere statistics whose economic value outweighs their 
personal intrinsic worth. Most often than not, they are trained to become 
“kids for the market” whose future role is to cater certain economic 
industries’ urgent needs and demands. This basically reflects the “exodus” 
of a multitude of citizens from the third world countries to fill in the labor 
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gap among the highly industrialized countries, leaving families behind 
in pursuit of a greener pasture. 
Furthermore, administrators and the members of the faculty 
are sometimes defined by their abstracted roles, fashioning them as 
“hollowed” persons of authority. This is particularly true among the 
academic institutions that still uphold the traditional notion that the authority 
of teachers is infallible. On this note, Gale observes that the teacher’s 
authority is no less than the “product of the ideology of the dominant 
class and that the teacher’s discourse is an embodiment of the dominant 
class’s ideology and its power”.13 It cannot be emphasized enough that 
most intellectual violence that happens inside the classroom stem from 
the imbalance of authority between teachers and students. Traditionally, 
teachers are deemed as knowledge providers, transmitters of information 
and masters of certain skills whose authority was generally accepted as 
something beyond question. Such pedagogical authority, nevertheless, 
serve to perpetuate a dominant class through its own dominant discourse 
thereby maintaining a social hierarchy that divides people according to 
social classes and categorizations. While a totalizing act is obviously 
present in the imposition of a teacher’s authority over the students, the 
teachers paradoxically become totalized within the pedagogical ideology 
that they themselves represent. In the same manner, other employees, 
who hold less authoritative, but equally important positions, are looked 
upon simply as data and figures – always dispensable. From an ethical 
standpoint, these people are not supposed to be treated any less than one 
treats a person with distinction. 
By and large, regardless of position in the educational organization, 
individuals are susceptible to objectification, which necessarily results to 
a subtle but brutal commodification that violates a person’s irreducibility 
to totality. These totalizing relations and encounters tend to diminish one’s 
personal sense of transcendence. Whenever objectification occurs, there is 
always a failure to dissociate the person from the function. In other words, 
any act of totalizing occurs when one only sees the distinction and not 
the individual, the position and not the person, the role and not the face. 
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The second level of interaction in which Formal Education 
manifests its totalizing tendency is the students’ obligation to follow an 
inherently hegemonic school curriculum. Joldersma observes that the 
“Western thought generally has involved the desire to reduce reality 
to a rationally grasped system”.14 What this means is that the Western 
paradigm – where most school curricula are basically patterned – gravitate 
towards an absolutist truth-paradigm generally leading to a unified system 
of thought. Such paradigm is no less than totalizing. Quoting Levinàs, he 
adds, “the history of Western thought can be interpreted as an attempt at a 
universal synthesis, a reduction of all experience . . . to a totality wherein 
consciousness embraces the world, leaving nothing other outside itself, 
and thus becomes absolute thought”.15
A school curriculum is, no doubt, an essential roadmap that 
provides the proper directions towards a particular career destination. 
It stipulates clear oversight as to which “path” one should follow to 
arrive at pre-conceived desired outcomes. It arranges the necessary steps 
that facilitate in the gradual transformative process and also allows for 
evaluative measures in order to recognize progress, spot hindrances, and 
determine areas for development. However, insofar as a curriculum specifies 
what learning areas should be covered, it inevitably leaves out what it 
deems unnecessary. By necessity, it emphasizes one thing and strikes out 
another. This is where the totalizing tendency may actually take place. A 
curriculum reduces knowledge into a whole, a unified concept that can 
be contained within a course or a discipline as if there is nothing more to 
it. One must be quick to note that this does not mean that the tendency 
for totality should be eradicated. It is not a matter of choosing between a 
totalizing or non-totalizing curriculum. A concept for example, already 
involves totality. One cannot clearly grasp a thought without the mind 
“totalizing” that particular thought into a single concept. However, in 
the realm of human relationships and education, what is imperative is to 
recognize that there is always an overflowing of totality. This means that 
one cannot totally objectify a particular knowledge, much less an-other 
person. Something always eludes intellectual grasp. Something always 
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escapes the boundaries set by human thought and judgment which demand 
proper attention. Hence, in formal education, a curriculum can only do 
so much. It should not be taken to mean that it is all there is to know. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that those who are involved in instruction 
and research are obligated to impress on the learners that, like a roadmap 
a curriculum only points to a way, but it never assumes to claim that it 
is the only way. 
Moreover, this totalizing tendency also occurs in the area of 
assessment and determination of a learner’s “grade”. Most often than not, 
the assessment tools usually utilized for student evaluations are based on 
certain criteria that are rather totalizing. It is not surprising that within 
academic institutions, competition among students to vie for the top position 
of a class or to finish school with honors is tolerated, if not given more 
emphasis. But we may ask, what is really the purpose of giving students 
grades and honors? Do they not serve merely as indicators of progress, 
which also determine the areas for further development? Ironically, what 
may be at times observed in a class setting is the students’ eagerness to 
pursue grades rather than learning, rank rather than skill. This is why an 
unhealthy competition may ensue between and among students who are 
driven by a certain need for approval through the achievement of excellent 
grades, rather than the achievement of excellent learning. 
The view that Formal Education has a totalizing tendency through 
these levels of interactions is the key to understanding the challenge for 
its constant reconfiguration and re-evaluation. If one were simply to 
accept the status quo of academic practices based on traditional erroneous 
assumptions as normal, then it would not be surprising that the kind of 
graduates produced will be as totalizing as they themselves had been 
totalized within the very institutions they came from. This is not to say 
that formal education is inherently defective and unethical. What this 
means is that the intersections of power and authority within the structure 
of formal education should be guarded from human excesses and from 
the subtle totalizing tendencies that normally stem from the multitude of 
interactions within the system.  
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In what follows, I will argue that Matthew Lipman’s version of 
Community of Inquiry may be used as a pedagogical model that avoids 
the totalizing tendencies that are susceptible in a normal formal education 
setting. 
lipman’s Community of inquiry
Matthew Lipman (1922-2010) re-emphasizes the modern critique 
against the normal standard of pedagogical practices which are driven 
by traditional and flawed assumptions. In his Thinking in Education, 
he explains that the dominating assumptions of the standard paradigm 
include the erroneous idea that education consists in the transmission of 
knowledge and that the teacher’s role is infallible. Also, this paradigm 
adheres to the assumption that knowledge is unambiguous, unequivocal 
and un-mysterious; that knowledge is spread into different disciplines 
which are exhaustive and do not overlap; and worse, that the students 
learn by absorbing information.  
To counter this, he offers what he calls “Reflective Paradigm of 
Critical Practice” which basically follows a set of pedagogical practices 
driven by assumptions totally opposite to that of the traditional standard 
practice.16 In this paradigm, education is essentially inquiry-based and 
that the teacher is not infallible. It regards knowledge as always marked 
by traits of ambiguity, equivocality and mystery; that the different 
disciplines or bodies of knowledge are non-exhaustive and overlapping; 
and most importantly, the students’ themselves already possess the inherent 
capabilities for thinking, reflecting and judging.17 
The Community of Inquiry, a term he borrowed from Charles Sanders 
Pierce, is a pedagogical model that he used for his main project, i.e. 
Philosophy for Children. For Lipman, education should be administered 
along the lines of collaborative pedagogy which emphasizes inquiry 
over explication, redistributes power and authority in the classroom and 
fosters multidimensional thinking. He describes that “the progress of a 
Community of Inquiry is guided by the Gestalt quality of the unique, 
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immediately experienced inquiry situation… and that the educational 
community of inquiry actively discusses the subject matter under 
investigation”.18 In other words, in the said community, everyone (including 
the teacher) is concerned about discovering new forms of knowledge and 
painstakingly reaching an “aha moment” through collaborative inquiry. 
It, therefore, does not merely conform to a prepared curriculum, absorb 
its contents and answer its pre-defined examinations. The role of teachers 
does not include the traditional conception that they act as pedagogical 
philanthropists, that is, knowledge providers for impoverished minds. 
On the contrary, teachers are deemed as facilitators and collaborators. 
Their role is to “mediate not to dominate”.19 In this way, the students are 
constantly prodded to examine their process of thinking, encouraged to 
look at things from different perspectives and enjoined with the rest to 
follow where the argument leads. 
Drawing from pragmatism’s notion on education, the Community 
of Inquiry operates on the assumption that knowledge is produced through 
a dialogical interchange with the other members in a social group. An 
individual can only learn so much. But the richness of experiences and 
knowledge in a community, which come from diverse individuals, 
actually result to a deeper and more impactful learning experience. It is in 
this context that individual differences – or alterity – are given emphasis. 
A group of individuals do not automatically make up a “community” 
especially if it is removed from the values of respect and responsibility. 
Likewise, a group of individuals do not necessarily become a “community” 
if they only have one voice, and stubbornly adhere to such voice. In other 
words, what constitute a community, in the first place, are the inherent 
differences each member brings to the group. These differences manifest 
in the uniqueness of each other’s experiences and points of view. Hence, 
without the recognition of the otherness of each other, chances are, such 
group would either become anarchic or totalitarian. 
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Creative, Caring and Critical thinking
The Community of Inquiry fosters multidimensional thinking. 
Lipman argues that, contrary to common opinion, critical thinking is not 
all there is to know about proper thinking. In fact, there are other modes 
of thinking that are equally essential in education. We may mistake the 
notion that thinking critically is the only paramount, and therefore should 
be given more priority over other mental skills. This, however, should 
not be the case. For Lipman, “one must be on one’s guard not to give the 
impression…that critical thinking is equal to the whole of thinking”.20 In 
other words, thinking does not follow a linear process because there are 
different modes of thinking as there are intentions for thinking. These 
modes are: Critical, Creative and Caring thinking.
It may be well to note that these three modes of thinking should 
not be construed as isolated and independently compartmentalized since 
they are in a continual transaction with each other. Most importantly, these 
three modalities are best cultivated within the context of a community 
of inquiry. 
Critical Thinking, according to Matthew Lipman is thinking that 
“facilitates judgment because it relies on criteria, is self-correcting, and 
is sensitive to context”.21  It cannot be emphasized enough that reliance 
on a sound logical criteria is vital in arriving at any form of judgment. 
This prevents students from making judgments based merely on impulse, 
emotions and groundless claims. Likewise, it essentially consists of a 
meta-cognitive skill that involves a constant evaluation of the quality 
of one’s own thinking. In other words, critical thinking requires that the 
thinker subjects its own thinking into constant assessment by determining 
his/her assumptions and reasons. Also, to think critically involves sensi-
tivity to the context. In other words, it does not operate by merely using 
general ideas as “templates” that can be applied in all circumstances. 
Moving forward, critical thinking intersects with equally decisive 
values of creative and caring thinking. Lipman lists twelve (12) values that 
are to be found in Creative Thinking. These are: Originality, Productivity, 
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Imagination, Independence, Experimentation, Holism, Expression, 
Self-transcendence, Surprise, Generativity, Maieuticity, and Inventiveness. 
These values, however, notes Lipman, do not represent the entire spectrum 
of creative thinking, but rather serve as a summary of generic values 
under which other specific values may be included.
Among these twelve values, four are worth expounding in relation 
to their resistance to the totalizing tendency in Formal Education.22 
Originality generally refers to the cognitive process of arriving at products 
of thought without basing from prior patterns. It is carefully treating the 
circumstantial elements as building blocks in reaching a different point 
of view that offers new solutions. Productivity, on the other hand, is a 
value-concept that aims at achieving practical and appropriate results. It 
does not stop at the meta-cognitive process but dives deep into realizing 
tangible productive consequences. Independence is another value-concept 
that stimulates thinking outside the “normal” ways of thinking. In other 
words, it tries to access the type of thinking that does not subscribe to 
what the “crowd” would normally think. Overlapping with the meaning 
of originality, independent-thinking also emphasizes uniqueness and 
innovation which may, or may not be, consonant with what the majority 
thinks. Lastly, experimentation is another reliable creative thinking-tool 
that places importance in following a process that is guided by hypotheses. 
Just like a scientific experiment, this value-concept does not bypass the 
essential roles of trial and error, testing, validation and repetition.
Moreover, Lipman mentions several manifestations of Caring 
Thinking, namely, Appreciative thinking, Affective thinking, Active thinking, 
Normative thinking and Empathic thinking. 
Three (3) out of these six are likewise worth expounding due to 
their inherent values that run counter to the totalizing tendency in Formal 
Education. 
Appreciative thinking is paying close attention to things that 
are important. Essentially, it involves valuing. It is only when we look 
closely – hence, appreciatively – at certain things that we come to value 
their individualities and respect their differences. Active thinking, on the 
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other hand, is an act of caring for something or someone, which in a 
sense, is active. This thinking manifests in some forms of cognition that 
necessarily lead to action. Further, normative thinking is constitutive 
of caring thinking. Insofar as each act of caring involves an awareness 
of the ideals of a caring behavior, such thinking is normative, which is 
essentially cognitive. 
By and large, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that critical, 
creative and caring thinking are essential in the process of education. 
Unlike many academic settings, the Community of Inquiry values a 
balanced and holistic process of thinking in education. It does not only 
highlight critical thinking, which if used wrongly, might lead to absolutism 
and dogmatism. Rather, it also seeks to develop a kind of thinking that 
is not bereft of emotions, valuations and care. It is for this reason that a 
Community of Inquiry thrives despite the varying and even conflicting 
views among the members. The value-concept of thinking critically, 
creatively and caringly provide a “safety net” that prevents the students 
from resorting to acts of violence, which is one of the many possibilities 
when there are conflicting points of view. 
In particular, critical questions provide, according to Browne 
and Keeley, a “stimulus and direction for critical thinking; they move 
us forward toward a continual, ongoing search for better opinions, 
decisions, or judgments”.23 This is why the Community of Inquiry serves 
as a counter-witness to the traditional classroom atmosphere where rigid 
competition and individual performance are valued and emphasized. 
Instead, it aims at providing an ambiance that promotes cooperation and 
mutual trust that makes healthy argumentation and discussion possible. In 
a Community of Inquiry, “students could work together without the fear 
of failing or disappointing their classmates”.24 In a BBC documentary, 
Lipman stresses that a community of inquiry 
…is not a community of solidarity where everybody feels 
the same and has the same ideas and sensations and so 
forth, but [a kind of community] where there’s a division of 
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feeling; there’s a complementarity of feeling and of thinking. 
So they rely on each other, depend on each other. It’s very 
much like a team where there are certain people who are 
good at passing and others good at running. And they 
depend on each other; they know they can count on each 
other. And that’s the community we are trying to create.25
  
The values in a Community of Inquiry are not normally fostered 
in the traditional standard of education. What is more emphasized in 
the standard paradigm is the students’ gradual ascent from their own 
levels to that of the teacher through passive absorption of knowledge 
and skills. Consequently, this leads towards competition, jealousy and 
even antagonism towards the so-called “academic achievements” of 
some students. Hence, the classroom becomes an arena, a place where a 
student is compelled to prove to others his/her capabilities. Just like the 
standard paradigm of educational practice, the community of inquiry aims 
to enhance the students’ cognitive skills, such as building an argument, 
evaluating criteria and responding to certain propositions. However, unlike 
the standard paradigm, the community of inquiry goes a little further as 
to provide an avenue for the students to develop their creative and caring 
modalities of thinking. In other words, inasmuch as the students are taught 
to be rational and critical, they are also, and most importantly, taught 
(in the process of collaborative inquiry) how to feel, to care for the other, 
to take responsibility for the other and to stay creative. In the process, 
the students learn the manner of “listening to objections carefully, taking 
them seriously and disagreeing with them without fighting or feeling hurt 
by the disagreement”.26 What is interesting is that these values are not 
taught didactically by a teacher. The students do not learn their meaning 
in the same way as they learn an object or a concept. Rather, they learn 
these through experience as they go through the process of collaborative 
inquiry. In other words, in a Community of Inquiry, learning actually 
takes place without the teacher’s explication.    
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Conclusion
I have argued that Formal Education – being an institution – has 
the tendency to reduce its stakeholders into mere social actors that simply 
function according to their assumed status. However, Levinàs reminds 
each individual’s infinite responsibility to the other which begins by 
recognizing the radical alterity and irreducibility of the other to some 
object devoid of identity and worth. Pedagogical encounters remain 
superficial when it does not penetrate into the depths of one’s subjectivity. 
In other words, learning is not guaranteed when a distance is always 
maintained between the participants in the entire process. A teacher, for 
instance, does not do well in collaborating with the students’ intellectual 
journey if s/he treats them merely as a “class”, that is, a group of students 
without voices of their own. This generalizing and totalizing tendency 
in formal education bypasses the most important element in the learning 
process: the individual face. Matthew Lipman’s Community of Inquiry 
unsettles such traditional mode of interaction within the Formal Education 
setting where individuals (e.g. students and teachers) become susceptible 
to objectification. In a Community of Inquiry, the process of learning 
begins from the basic assumption that each member is unique, important 
and valued. It avoids the usual pedagogical mistake of treating all students 
under a uniform academic standard. In turning ordinary classrooms to 
Communities of Inquiry, all become participants in the collaborative 
process of learning, including the teacher. It must be emphasized that 
the teacher’s role is not to feign ignorance or impose mastery. Rather, 
the teacher sees to it that the values of dialogue and the nurturance of 
critical, creative and caring thinking are fostered and maintained. In such 
context, the totalizing tendency in the level of interaction between the 
teacher and the students is diminished precisely because, in the process 
of dialogue, each one allows everybody to be who they are. The students 
are not fearfully subjected under the totalizing gaze of the teacher.   
In the traditional formal education setup, the curricula take 
precedence in determining the trajectory of the students’ education in 
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a given period of time. In other words, it is the school that primarily 
determines what they should learn and how they are supposed to learn. 
On the contrary, in a Community of Inquiry, the curricula simply focus 
on developing the students’ capability to inquire and to think well. This 
does not mean to say that a curriculum is useless and therefore should be 
dispensed with. Rather, a curriculum must not go beyond what it is made 
for, that is, to guide and to serve as a roadmap towards higher forms of 
learning. This means to say that it does not serve as the sole determinant 
of what a student ought to know, much less dictate the manner by which 
to know. The basic assumption here is that, the students already possess 
the capabilities for learning. Hence, if the students are exposed on a 
dialogical environment where thinking critically, creatively and caringly 
is given primacy over contents, they will actually learn the mental 
tools that are necessary to use their reasons appropriately. This is why 
it is important that any learning process should run along the lines of 
collaborative inquiry. By this, the students are constantly prodded to 
inquire, discover and learn by themselves.
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